An attentionally demanding task undertaken during adaptation to motion reduces the duration of the subsequent motion aftereffect (A. Chaudhuri, 1990) . Previous studies have suggested that this effect is intramodal in character, reflecting the selective deployment of visual attention. The present study demonstrates that nonvisual tasks, performed concurrently with motion adaptation, can significantly reduce the duration of the ensuing aftereffect. Three experiments converge on the conclusion that postcategorical processes can influence otherwise unrelated concurrent precategorical processes. The experiments also show that neither perceptual input nor motor output components of the attentional task are responsible for the subsequent reduction in motion of aftereffect. The results suggest a reappraisal of findings in this area and of the general distinction between perception and cognition.
That early perceptual processes, such as motion perception, are functionally autonomous from central cognitive functioning is a view commonly held (e.g., Pashler, 1998 ; see Allport, 1993 , for comments on this distinction with regard to theories of attention). A corollary of this argument is that precategorical processesthose related to the physical properties of a stimulus-are autonomous from postcategorical processes such as lexical and semantic analysis. Generally speaking, although there are attentional limitations in both perceptual and central cognitive processing, these two limitations are regarded as independent and appear to be due to different underlying mechanisms (for a full review, see Pashler, 1998 ; see also Lavie, 2000) . This article reports a series of experiments that challenge this view. Using a paradigm that is novel to this debate, namely the attentional modulation of the motion aftereffect, we present evidence that processing of a perceptual attribute of a stimulus, namely motion, may be disrupted by concurrent cognitive (and hence postcategorical) tasks. On the basis of the experiments that follow, we claim that the autonomy of early visual processes from central cognitive processes has been overstated.
Following the continuous observation of motion in one direction, people tend to report a stationary stimulus as drifting for a time in the opposite direction. Various explanations have been advanced for the motion aftereffect, among them that it is the effect of fatigue (Barlow & Hill, 1963) or the de-or recalibration of directionally tuned neurons in the visual cortex (see Mather & Harris, 1998) . The motion aftereffect appears to be both automatic (i.e., not under the volitional control of the observer) and precategorical (necessarily, it does not make contact with the observer's linguistic repertoire). Despite the suggestion that pre-and postcategorical processing are autonomous, there have been a number of reports showing that tasks with postcategorical features performed concurrently with exposure to motion can reduce the duration of the motion aftereffect (Chaudhuri, 1990; Georgiades & Harris, 2000; Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997; Takeuchi & Kita, 1994) . For example, a task calling for the detection of numeric characters within an alphanumeric stream of characters that were presented in a central box surrounded by the drifting adaptation stimulus was found to significantly reduce the duration of the ensuing motion aftereffect (Chaudhuri, 1990) . One way of explaining this effect is to suppose that attentional modulation of the motion aftereffect is due to the selective deployment of modality-specific attentional resources: that visual attention has been allocated to the area of the screen that contained task-relevant information with a corresponding reduction in attention to the areas of the screen displaying motion (Braddick, 1990; Chaudhuri, 1990; Georgiades & Harris, 2000) . Thus, motion is less attended to, or possibly even inhibited, resulting in a motion aftereffect of reduced magnitude. An alternative interpretation is that the effect comes about because of interference between central cognitive processing and perceptual processing. Alas, the available evidence does not allow one to choose among these alternatives; in most studies-with rare and equivocal exceptions-the concurrent task has been both visual and cognitive. This means that a reduction in the duration of the motion aftereffect can be attributed either to changes in visual attention or to the action of cognitive processes.
One study has implicated the action of cognitive processing by showing that increasing the processing load (without a change in the perceptual nature of the display) can alter the magnitude of motion adaptation. Rees et al. (1997) presented words visually during the period of adaptation with instructions either to make a physical discrimination between the words (between upper-and lowercase lettering) or to make a discrimination based on the number of syllables in those words. Syllable-based discrimination attenuated the aftereffect more than the typeface discrimination. This finding was explained in terms of Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994) , which states that "capacity for perception is limited but that, within those limits, perception proceeds automatically . . . . The extent to which a target exhausts available capacity thus determines the extent to which the irrelevant distracting stimuli may be processed" (Rees et al., 1997 (Rees et al., , p. 1616 .
Although the results reported by Rees et al. (1997) can be interpreted as suggesting that cognitive elements of the task are important, it is difficult to be sure whether they can be attributed to processing differing in degree or differing in kind. Rees et al. couched the interpretation of their results in terms of the degree of processing the attentional tasks required. The typeface discrimination was referred to as low load, and the syllable discrimination was described as high load. This classification could be argued to be relatively arbitrary; the results could be due to the different kinds of processing required as each task draws on a different domain of processing (the perceptual and the linguistic, respectively).
Another way of gaining insight into the locus of attentional modulation of the motion aftereffect is to assign the perceptual element of the attentional task to a different sensory modality, a strategy adopted in the present study. This approach has already been taken within the attentional blink literature to address locusof-effect issues analogous to those under discussion here (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1999) . If a nonvisual task can be shown to affect motion adaptation, this would show a purely intramodal account of attentional modulation of the motion aftereffect to be incorrect. Although there are reports of the use of auditory tasks, few are from archival publications, and hence details of procedure and outcome are relatively sketchy. Three such reports are extant, and together they paint an equivocal picture. Two studies are published in abstract form only. One, by Zhou and Chen (1994) , had participants complete an auditory shadowing task during adaptation to motion. Their conclusion was guarded and nonspecific: "The engagement of attention to auditory task might reduce the total duration of MAEs [motion aftereffects]" (p. S1838). Additionally, the use of a rating system to measure the motion aftereffect and the lack of a fixation point in their experiment make the interpretation of their results difficult. Similarly, Garrod, Houghton, and Hammett (1998) demonstrated only equivocally that a tone discrimination task could modulate motion adaptation; they found the task only to attenuate the duration of the motion aftereffect under particular spatial conditions (when the source of the tones was spatially distinct from the visual display). It remains unclear whether the difficulty involved in resolving the spatial location of pure tones played a role in this effect.
In the third, and the only fully documented set of experiments, Rees, Frith, and Lavie (2001) suggested that auditory attentional tasks cannot modulate the motion aftereffect. The tasks used were similar to the visual tasks used in Rees et al. (1997) . Indeed, the report of Rees et al. (2001) features an additional replication of their earlier study using visual stimuli and, just as in their earlier study, the manipulations were couched in terms of load. The low-load task was to detect loud words among a stream of quieter words. The high-load task involved detecting disyllabic words among uni-and trisyllabic words. Whereas Rees et al. (1997) found a significant difference between the aftereffect attenuation caused by the low-load (physical discrimination) and high-load (syllable task) in the visual version of the experiment, this was not found in the auditory version. Rees et al. (2001) interpreted their results as being due to the modality-specific nature of human attention; they argued that there are attentional limitations within but not between sensory modalities (as also claimed by Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; Wickens, 1984) . However, the experiments of Rees et al. (2001) share some methodological problems with their earlier study (Rees et al., 1997) . Most notably, Rees et al. (2001) did not measure motion aftereffect durations in a no-task control condition. Without this safeguard, the experimental design used by Rees et al. (2001) is only sensitive to differences between tasks, not modalities; there may well have been an effect of the auditory task on the motion aftereffect, but this cannot be discerned from the design.
It may have been the case that modality and type of processing were confounded in the experiments of Rees et al. (2001) because, arguably, syllable discrimination is not equivalent in both auditory and visual modalities. When words are presented visually, the participant is required to subvocally articulate and thus recode each word to count its syllables, a process that requires central cognitive mechanisms. With auditory presentation of words, this requirement is much reduced because the word can be encoded directly in its auditory form, perhaps rendering the task closer in character to a perceptual judgment than a central cognitive task. The present series of experiments seek both to resolve the specific issue of whether nonvisual attentional tasks can be disruptive to visual motion processing and to address the broader theoretical debate regarding the relationship between pre-and postcategorical processing.
Measuring the Motion Aftereffect
The measure of the motion aftereffect used in the present set of studies is its duration, that is, the time between the onset of presentation of the stationary test stimulus and the participant's key press to indicate illusionary motion has ceased. Duration is the simplest measure of the motion aftereffect; it is easy for participants to understand and the most straightforward in implementation. The ease with which the simple statement "press the button when the illusionary motion has ceased" can be understood by participants is especially important in this study because expert participants were not recruited and the number of trials per participant was kept relatively low to avoid practice effects on the attentional task. Other methods, such as nulling using random dot kinematograms (e.g., Blake & Hiris, 1993) , require a period of "top-up" in which, following an initial adaptation period, further short exposures to motion are provided after each measurement is taken. This would clearly be inappropriate in the present experiments, on the grounds that repeated task alternation between the attentional task and the perceptual judgment might, arguably, add to the attentional load. Although duration is a subjective measure, it correlates well with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures of motion aftereffects in visual areas (e.g., Tootell et al., 1995 ; for a review, see Moore & Engel, 1999) . This close fit between participants' reports and brain activity remains the case when attention has been manipulated and the aftereffect has been attenuated, showing that attention modulates motion processing rather than merely biasing response criteria (Rees et al., 1997 (Rees et al., , 2001 . The logic behind the present study is that the motion aftereffect represents a good measure of a precategorical phenomenon: motion adaptation (and hence, motion perception). This assertion is supported by the common finding that the duration of the aftereffect is closely correlated with the time course of neural concomitants. Thus, it allows us to measure the extent, or quality, of precategorical perception during the adaptation period.
Experiment 1 studied the impact of a string-detection task on the motion aftereffect. The task required participants to detect threeitem strings within a stream of sequentially presented digits presented in either the visual or auditory modalities. Experiments 2 and 3, through the use of a backward counting task, expanded on the issues identified in the initial experiments and tested the application of Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 1995 (Lavie, , 2000 Lavie & Tsal, 1994) to the disruption of motion adaptation by a distracting secondary task.
Experiment 1
In this first experiment of the series, we assessed whether a string-detection task could disrupt early visual processing, as measured through the duration of the motion aftereffect. The stringdetection task stimuli were presented to one group of participants in visual form and to another group of participants in auditory form. The task required participants to detect the presentation of specific sequences of numbers (three different odd numbers consecutively presented) within a stream of digits presented throughout motion adaptation and to press a button when a target sequence was detected. Experiment 1 had two main aims. The first was to add generality to existing reports of attentional modulation of the motion aftereffect, which have mainly applied variants of the attentional task used by Chaudhuri (1990) that involved discriminating between alphabetic and numeric characters presented in a central box surrounded by the drifting adapting stimulus. A particularly problematic feature of the alphanumeric discrimination task used by Chaudhuri and others is that it requires frequent responding from participants, at least one button press every 2 s. Given that some theorists argue that an attentional bottleneck exists at the point of response selection and execution (Pashler, 1998; Pashler & Johnston, 1998) , the attentional task used by Chaudhuri risks confounding cognitive and perceptual demands with those of response generation. The string-detection task in the present study requires relatively few responses from the participant, thus allowing a less contaminated assessment of attentional effects.
The second motivation behind Experiment 1 was to clarify the results of Rees et al. (2001) using a task that does not run the risk of confounding type of processing with modality of presentation. The string-detection task used in the present experiment allows a direct comparison between sensory modalities because the modality of presentation does not fundamentally change the cognitive demands of the task. An additional manipulation made in the present experiment was to vary the number of target strings between trials. There was a maximum of three target strings and a minimum of zero target strings in the task conditions. The only difference between the zero-targets task condition and the passive observation control condition was that, in the zero-targets task condition, the participants were actively monitoring the stream of numbers as in the other task trials, although in this condition no target sequences actually appeared. In the control condition, although the numeric stream was still present, participants were asked not to monitor it. These two experimental conditions differed, therefore, only in the instructions given to participants and the attentional state the instructions engendered. The overt behavior of the participant remained ostensibly the same.
Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduate students (9 female, 9 male) of Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom, participated in the experiment for course credit. All reported normal vision and hearing. Participants were randomly allocated to two groups of 9; one group was given visual task stimuli, the other auditory task stimuli.
Apparatus and stimuli. Visual stimuli were generated using a Cambridge Research Systems (CRS) VSG2/3 image generator under computer control and displayed in gamma-corrected form on a 21-in. (53.34-cm) Sony CRT monitor at a refresh rate of 100 Hz. The viewing distance was 57 cm throughout. The adapting stimulus was a sinusoidal grating of 1 cycle/°, drifting at a rate of 2°per second presented in a 10-cm ϫ 22-cm window, surrounded by a gray mask (see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram of the visual stimuli). In the condition of visual presentation of task stimuli, the to-be-monitored stream appeared in a centrally located window in 48-point font. Digits were presented at a rate of 1 per second (0.75-s presentation, 0.25-s blank mask). The test stimulus was a stationary version of the sinusoidal grating used as the adapting stimulus. Participants responded to targets and reported motion aftereffect duration by pressing buttons on a CRS CT-3 response box that was linked to the serial port of the PC. In the condition of auditory presentation of task stimuli, the adapting and test stimuli were as above, with the difference that a small cross was placed within the central box for fixation during both task and control trials. Auditory stimuli consisted of discrete digital samples (.wav files) of numbers (1-9) spoken in steady monotone by a female voice. Each sample was adjusted using SoundForge 4.5 so that it was 1 s in total length (0.75 s of speech, 0.25 s of silence). These samples were replayed directly from the computer to produce a continuous stream. Sound was presented with a Fostex 6301B monitor speaker placed below the visual display unit.
Design. Participants served in either the visual or the auditory version of the experiment only. Within each form of the experiment, a repeated measures design was used with all participants undertaking all conditions. Each participant underwent a total of 30 trials: 5 initial practice trials, 5 control trials (passive observation, no task), 5 trials in which zero targets were presented (but participants were required to try to detect valid target strings), 5 trials in which one target was presented, 5 trials in which two targets were presented, and 5 trials in which three targets were presented. Order of trials was randomized for each participant.
String-detection task. The target string was defined in the instructions as "three, adjacently presented, different, odd numbers." Thus, an example of a valid target would be 3-9-7. When more than one target string appeared on a given trial, target strings were separated by a minimum of 10 filler numbers that did not contain a valid target string. The distribution of target strings across trials was rectangular. The rate of item presentation was 1 item per second. Trials were selected for analysis on the basis of two strict criteria; a false positive response (responding in error when there was no valid target string) or missing a valid target rendered that trial invalid. Invalid trials were reintroduced later in the session, until the criteria for task performance were met.
Procedure. Participants adapted to a drifting sinusoidal grating for 90 s, while fixating on the center of the screen, in which numbers were presented continuously throughout that period. In the case of the visual task, during the control condition participants were asked to fixate on the central window in which digits were presented, although they were not required to actively monitor those digits. In the task conditions, participants were asked to monitor the task stimuli for valid target strings and to respond promptly by pressing a button. At the end of the adaptation period, a stationary grating was presented. Participants were asked to continue to fixate on the screen and to press a button when the illusionary motion had ceased. There was an interval of 2 min between each of the trials to allow adaptation to fully dissipate.
In the case of the auditory task, the procedure was the same, albeit all task stimuli were presented in the auditory modality, and an unchanging fixation point was placed in the central window for fixation purposes. Auditory task stimuli were presented during the control condition, but the participants were instructed to regard it as irrelevant.
Results
Visual string detection. Figure 2 shows the mean motion aftereffect durations by experimental condition. The string-detection task attenuated the motion aftereffect relative to the control condition at all target levels, most crucially in the condition in which no targets were actually presented. This was confirmed by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(4, 32) ϭ 9.68, MSE ϭ 23.47, p Ͻ .01. Subsequent post hoc Tukey-Kramer analysis revealed that the control condition differed significantly from all the task conditions ( p Ͻ .05), but there were no significant differences between any of those task conditions. Participants repeated trials, either because of missing a target string or making a false positive, an average of five times per session. An ANOVA shows that there was no significant effect of the number of targets presented on the rate of task failure, F(3, 24) ϭ 0.27, MSE ϭ 0.67, p ϭ .88.
Auditory string detection. Figure 3 plots motion aftereffect durations, grouped by condition. Substantial attenuation of the motion aftereffect is evident, and it is statistically significant according to a one-way ANOVA, F(4, 32) ϭ 4.39, MSE ϭ 18.75, p Ͻ .01. Tukey-Kramer post hoc analysis revealed that the control condition differed from all task conditions with the exception of the two-target condition, but there are no differences between the task conditions themselves at the p Ͻ .05 level. Participants failed in their performance of the task (either by missing a valid target or making a false-positive response) an average of four times. This failure rate did not vary with the number of target strings presented, F(3, 24) ϭ 1.48, MSE ϭ 0.96, p ϭ .24.
Visual and auditory string detection. Task data sets were normalized with regard to means of the individual control condition so that the magnitude of attenuation could be compared. Data were normalized by dividing each participant's mean aftereffect durations in each condition by their mean control condition aftereffect duration. This was deemed appropriate given the sometimes large individual differences in baseline motion aftereffect durations reported by participants. There were no significant differences between visual and auditory sequence detection, according to an ANOVA, F(1, 16) ϭ 1.93, MSE ϭ 76.29, p Ͻ .184. No effects of task modality were evident in the error data, F(1, 16) ϭ 2.57, MSE ϭ 0.44, p ϭ .13, and no interaction of modality and number of targets was found, F(4, 80) ϭ 0.32, MSE ϭ 0.04, p Ͼ .05.
Discussion
The results demonstrate that the string-detection task, in both visual and auditory forms, significantly reduced the duration of the motion aftereffect. We claim that this is the first unequivocal demonstration that an auditory task can attenuate motion adaptation. Our string-detection task is a slower and less responseintensive task than those previously shown to be disruptive to motion adaptation (e.g., Chaudhuri, 1990 ), yet it was sufficient to cause a significant reduction in the duration of the motion aftereffect. This suggests that motion perception is more sensitive to disruption than previously thought. The number of targets, and hence the number of responses (given our strict criteria), had no influence on the degree to which the motion aftereffect was reduced. This points to the important conclusion that response generation is not responsible for attenuation of the motion aftereffect. The results also provide clear evidence of postcategorical processing interfering with precategorical processing. In the control conditions, the digit stream was present but unattended, and thus subject only to obligatory, automatic processing. However, in the task conditions the items in the digit streams were subject to postcategorical orthographic analysis and manipulation within short-term memory. Thus, the difference between aftereffect duration in control trials and task trials in which no targets were presented may be firmly attributed to perceptual/cognitive differences between the two conditions.
Experiment 2
Although it is clear from the results of Experiment 1 that attenuation of the motion aftereffect is not a product of response production, at the same time the results are consistent with the simple hypothesis that the reduction in aftereffect duration is due to the intake of information alone. To check on this possibility, in Experiment 2 we used a task that required no response production and minimal intake of information during the period of adaptation but required the manipulation of postcategorical information, namely backward counting. Participants were instructed to count backward in steps of either 3 or 7 from a randomly generated three-digit number. To eliminate self-generated auditory input, we instructed participants to do this subvocally. Asking participants to report the number they had reached at the end of the trial allowed an estimate to be made of the degree of compliance with instructions.
A previous report has claimed that mental arithmetic is disruptive to perceptual processing, although the extent to which the perceptual task was contaminated by constraints on memory casts doubt on the result. Kahneman, Beatty, and Pollack (1967) asked participants to monitor a sequence of letters, presented at five letters per second, for the appearance of the letter K. Performance in this task was good (88.5% of targets detected) but declined (to 68.5%) when participants also had to perform a concurrent mental addition task (adding one digit to every digit of a spoken fourfigure number). Although this may appear to be good evidence of concurrent cognitive operations degrading perceptual encoding, there remains the possibility that mental arithmetic merely distracted participants: "The arithmetic task may have prevented the subjects from periodically reminding themselves they had to look for Ks; the actual performance of the arithmetic task may not have directly affected the perception of letters, as Kahneman and colleagues assumed" (Pashler, 1998, p. 314) . By using the duration of the motion aftereffect as our dependent measure-asking merely that participants passively fixate on the screen without requiring any response-it is possible to sidestep the difficulty of forgetting instructions.
The present experiment also tests the theory of Rees et al. (1997) that the amount of aftereffect attenuation is directly related to the attentional load imposed by the concurrent task. The load posed by counting backward in 3s is compared with the load produced by counting backward in 7s. This manipulation has been used in other paradigms, most notably in short-term memory experiments (e.g., Kroll & Hellicutt, 1972 ), and appears to be an effective way of varying concurrent attentional load.
It is worth noting that Lavie's theory of attention, as described in Rees et al. (1997) , is a theory of perceptual, rather than cognitive, load. A more recent exposition and extension of Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 2000) suggests that cognitive and perceptual load have different implications for concurrent perceptual activities. Increasing perceptual load has the action of reducing the processing of irrelevant stimuli because spare attentional resources that would have otherwise been used in the obligatory processing of irrelevant stimuli are recruited for the primary task. In contrast, a cognitive load, such as the retention of information in short-term memory, increases the likelihood of irrelevant stimuli impinging on the primary task because central cognitive systems are necessary for the inhibition of irrelevant responses. Indeed, it is argued that this distinction makes it possible to dissociate attentional functions on the basis of how they are affected by different types of load. Given that the backward counting task used in the present study has no obvious perceptual or response elements beyond the monitoring of a tone so subtraction can be performed at a constant rate, it is reasonable to take the view that the load it imposes is almost entirely cognitive in nature. Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 2000) thus predicts that backward counting should have little or no impact on motion adaptation.
Method
Participants. Nine students (6 female, 3 male) of Cardiff University participated in the experiment for course credit. All reported normal hearing and vision.
Apparatus and stimuli. The visual grating stimulus was as in the auditory form of Experiment 1. A pair of stereo headphones was used to present a pure tone at a rate of 0.5 Hz that acted as a metronome for the pacing of backward counting. Participants signaled the end of the motion aftereffect by pressing a button on a CRS CT-3 response box.
Design. A repeated measures design was used. All participants undertook all conditions. Each participant underwent a total of 35 trials: 5 initial practice trials, 10 control trials (passive observation only), 10 trials in which they were asked to count backward in steps of 3, and 10 trials in which they were asked to count backward in steps of 7. Order of trials was randomized for each participant.
Procedure. Each trial commenced with on-screen instructions informing participants of the current condition. In the control trials, following presentation of the word control, participants viewed the drifting sinusoidal grating for 90 s, fixating on a small centrally presented cross. A stationary grating was then presented, and participants pressed a button when they had judged illusionary motion to have ceased. In the task conditions, a three-digit number and an instruction to count backward in either 3s or 7s were presented on-screen at the start of the trial. The randomly generated starting digit was never greater than 999 or less than 429 (so that the finishing total was never less than a three-digit number to maintain a constant memory load for the running total in a given trial). Motion adaptation then commenced, and participants counted backward subvocally at a rate of one subtraction every 2 s for a period of 90 s. A pure tone was played over headphones every 2 s to aid timing (this was present in the control conditions but in this case participants were asked to ignore it). Counting ceased when the stationary test stimulus was presented. Participants then pressed a button when they judged the illusion to have ceased. The trial concluded with the participant telling the experimenter verbally the three-digit number that they had reached. The performance criteria were plus or minus 9 in the counting backward in 3s condition, and plus or minus 21 in the counting backward in 7s condition. Participants were asked to repeat any trials in which they failed to reach this standard at the end of the session. Each trial was separated by a 2-min interval to eliminate the effects of cumulative adaptation.
Results
Backward counting caused a significant reduction in the duration of the motion aftereffect, F(2, 16) ϭ 9.81, MSE ϭ 19.88, p Ͻ .01. Tukey-Kramer post hoc analysis showed that counting backward in 7s was, in terms of attenuation caused, no more disruptive than counting backward in 3s. The data are plotted in Figure 4 .
Participants failed to complete the task to the criteria described an average of 3.7 times in the 3s condition and 4.1 times in the 7s condition. A paired t test demonstrated no reliable difference between performance in the two conditions, t(8) ϭ 1.0, p ϭ .35.
Discussion
Experiment 2 generated two findings of note: (a) that a backward counting task is sufficient to modulate the motion aftereffect and (b) that this modulation appears insensitive to the manipulation of processing load. Additionally, Experiment 2 replicates the results from the zero-targets task conditions in Experiment 1, thereby showing that the reduction of the motion aftereffect is not dependent on motor output during the period of adaptation. To this is added the novel finding that perceptual input is not a necessary condition for reducing the extent of motion adaptation. Rather, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the key cause of disruption to motion processing is the engagement of cognition in concurrent postcategorical processing. The findings of the present experiment strongly support the notion that precategorical processing can, contrary to the arguments of Pashler (1998) , be strongly influenced by a concurrent but unrelated postcategorical task.
Differences between counting backward in steps of 3 or 7 were not evident in the results, despite the fact that such a manipulation has been effective in differentially disrupting short-term memory processes (Kroll & Hellicutt, 1972) . This result is not in line with the load-based theory proposed by Rees et al. (1997) and at the same time is in contradiction of Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 2000) , which would have predicted that a cognitive load would, on the whole, exert little influence over early perceptual processes. Perhaps the range of difficulty used in Experiment 2 was not sufficiently great to demonstrate a differential effect of load; thus, to further examine the relationship between cognitive postcategorical processing load and motion perception, we carried out an additional experiment but this time used a wider range of difficulty.
Experiment 3
To maximize the chances of finding a differential effect of load, we chose to compare the effects on the motion aftereffect of counting backward in 2s during adaptation with counting backward in 12s. Although it is intuitively the case that counting backward in 2s is easier than counting backward in 12s simply because of the number of units one must subtract, the two also differ in the load they place on short-term memory. In the case of counting backwards in 2s, only once in every five subtractions must the three-digit running total be adjusted by more than one digit. In the case of subtracting by 12s, two of the three digits are changed with every subtractive operation and all three change every nine subtractions.
It is found almost ubiquitously throughout the mental arithmetic literature that as an arithmetic problem becomes larger (in terms of the sum or product of operands in the arithmetical operation), both error rates and reaction times increase (for a review, see Ashcraft, 1992) . This relationship holds for subtractive operations (Siegler, 1987) , as in the present experiment. It must be conceded that the assessment of cognitive load is unfortunately a somewhat circular process: The load a given secondary task entails can only be quantitatively measured post hoc as a change in the efficiency with which the primary task is performed. However, given the corroboration in the mental arithmetic literature, it seems reasonable to conclude that changing the step size of a backward subtraction task is a manipulation of overall processing load. Therefore, comparing the relatively easy task of counting backward in 2s with the much harder task of counting backward in 12s is likely to show whether the motion aftereffect is sensitive to attentional load in a cognitive task.
Method
Participants. Nine students (6 female, 3 male) of Cardiff University participated in the experiment. All reported normal hearing and vision.
Apparatus and stimuli. The visual grating stimulus was as in the auditory form of Experiment 1. As in Experiment 2 a pair of stereo headphones was used to present a pure tone at a rate of 0.5 Hz, which acted as a metronome for the pacing of backward counting.
Procedure. The procedure was as in Experiment 2, with the exception that the two task conditions were counting backward in 2s and 12s. The criteria for performance on these tasks were plus or minus 6 and plus or minus 36, respectively. If these criteria were not met, the trials were reintroduced into the experimental schedule until the criteria were met. The starting three-digit number was never less than 664, in which counting backward in 12s had to be performed so that the memory load was constantly a three-figure number.
Results
Counting backward significantly reduced motion aftereffect duration, F(2, 16) ϭ 25.69, MSE ϭ 30.01, p Ͻ .01. Tukey-Kramer post hoc analysis showed that all three conditions-control (passive observation), counting backward in 2s, and counting backward in 12s-differed from each other at the p Ͻ .05 level. Aftereffect durations are plotted by condition in Figure 5 . Participants failed to reach criterion level in the Ϫ2 condition an average of 1 time per session. Participants failed to reach criterion level in the Ϫ12 condition an average of 4.7 times per session. A paired t test confirmed this to be a statistically significant difference, t(8) ϭ 9.43, p Ͻ .01.
Given the variability in baseline aftereffect durations between individual participants, to allow comparison of magnitude of attenuation between Experiments 2 and 3, we normalized the data with regard to individual baseline scores. Four t tests were carried out to compare counting backward in 3s and 7s with counting backward in 2s and 12s. No significant differences were found, even without Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons: Ϫ2 compared with Ϫ3, t(16) ϭ 1.17, p ϭ .26; Ϫ2 compared with Ϫ7, t(16) ϭ 1.16, p ϭ .26; Ϫ12 compared with Ϫ3, t(16) ϭ 0.88, p ϭ .39; and Ϫ12 compared with Ϫ7, t(16) ϭ 0.49, p ϭ .63.
Error rates comparisons were also made, again using t tests. All but the 12s versus 7s comparison yielded statistically significant differences: Ϫ2 compared with Ϫ3, t(16) ϭ 6.40, p Ͻ .001; Ϫ2 compared with Ϫ7, t(16) ϭ 6.07, p Ͻ .001; Ϫ12 compared with Ϫ3, t(16) ϭ 2.18, p ϭ .04; and Ϫ12 compared with Ϫ7, t(16) ϭ 1.25, p ϭ .23.
Discussion
In Experiment 3, the motion aftereffect was again disrupted by a backward counting task that required very little perceptual input or response output, replicating the findings of Experiment 2. Even the relatively modest task of a running subtraction in steps of 2s was sufficient to attenuate the aftereffect. Subtracting in 12s led to significantly more attenuation than did 2s, suggesting, contrary to Experiment 2, that the paradigm is sensitive to task load.
That a load effect was found enhances the claim that motion adaptation was degraded by cognitive rather than perceptual factors associated with the attentional task. The only ostensibly perceptual element of the backward counting task was listening for the auditory tone that indicated the pace of subtraction required. While the size of the calculation was changed by varying the size of the subtraction, and thus presumably attentional load was also varied, the act of listening to tones was the same across all conditions (with the exception of the control condition, in which it may simply have been ignored). In contrast to Experiment 2, there was a statistically significant difference in the frequency with which participants met the task performance criteria; participants fared considerably better counting backward in 2s than in 12s. Although this may be taken as evidence of the manipulation of attentional load, when considered together with the data from Experiment 2, there does not appear to be a clear relationship between error rate and the extent of attenuation of motion adaptation; differences in error rate were for example manifest in the comparison between the counting backward in 2s and counting backward in 7s, yet there was no difference found between the motion aftereffect durations for these conditions. This said, the parameter space of these effects is relatively uncharted; it is possible that ceiling or floor effects prevented the identification of a clear relationship between task performance and motion aftereffect.
The present experiment supports Lavie's theory of attention as described in Rees et al. (1997) in that a differential effect of load was found. However, these results (taken with those of Experiment 2) do pose something of a problem for Lavie's theory of attention as more fully described in Lavie (2000) . While the exact point at which a distinction can be cleaved between perception and cognition is debatable, it seems reasonable to regard the backward counting task to be an almost purely cognitive exercise. To recapitulate, Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 2000) suggests that cognitive load will not impose limitations on perception of the sort found in the present experiments; rather, it is understood to have its locus of effect within the cognitive sphere only, weakening the action of inhibitory processes. Likewise, perceptual load is understood only to have its action on other perceptual activities and therefore only affects central cognition indirectly (by making more sensory data available in the first place). Thus the precategorical (sensory/perceptual) and postcategorical (cognitive) divide is an integral part of Lavie's theory. The present results appear to effectively falsify both Lavie's theory of attention and the general view that pre-and postcategorical systems are functionally independent.
General Discussion
In the series of experiments presented here, the cognitive characteristics of tasks disruptive to motion perception were explored. Whereas earlier reports have treated attentional modulation of the motion aftereffect as an intramodal phenomenon, we have demonstrated to the contrary; the effect occurs across modalities and is likely due to the cognitive, rather than perceptual, elements of distracting secondary tasks. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we demonstrated that a string-detection task, when performed concurrently with adaptation to motion, reduced the duration of the motion aftereffect even though it required few responses from participants and featured a slower rate of item presentation than in previous reports. This conclusion is further elaborated on by the demonstration that, despite a previous report to the contrary, an auditory task (in this case an auditory form of the string-detection task) was as effective as a visual task in reducing the perceived duration of the motion aftereffect. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that a subvocal backward counting task also attenuated the motion aftereffect, confirming that the perceptual processing of task-related stimuli and motor responding played no significant role in modulating the extent of motion adaptation.
Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 2000; Rees et al., 1997 ) is supported insofar as an effect of load in the backward counting task was found. However, Lavie's theory was contradicted simply by the finding that this task attenuated motion adaptation at all; cognitive, as opposed to perceptual, load is not held to be disruptive to early perception. This finding suggests that Rees et al. (1997) showed typecase discrimination and syllabic discriminations to differentially modulate the motion aftereffect possibly because the two tasks entailed different cognitive, rather than perceptual, attentional loads. It would appear that Lavie's theory of attention (Lavie, 2000) is in need of revision if it is to accommodate the present results. Some suggestions are made later in this section.
Interference Between Central Cognitive Processes and Perception
The frequent execution of button-press responses has been a feature of the majority of tasks found to be disruptive to motion adaptation (e.g., Chaudhuri, 1990 ). It has not been clear until the present experimental series whether, given the close association of attention with action, responding was a necessary component of a task that attenuated the motion aftereffect. Across three experiments-involving digit string detection (Experiment 1) and silent backward counting (Experiments 2 and 3)-attentionally demanding tasks that require no physical response (such as a button press or verbal response) during exposure to motion nevertheless produced a marked reduction in the duration of the motion aftereffect.
That responding is trivial in the modulation of the motion aftereffect is theoretically significant because some have argued that the main bottleneck in attention is at the point of responding, and that this limitation is distinct from those in perceptual processing (see Pashler, 1998; Pashler & Johnston, 1998) . The main class of empirical support for this position is that responding to one stimulus may occur concurrently and without penalty with the perceptual processing of another, successively presented, stimulus. No reduction in accuracy or increase in latency in the second response is found over variations in stimulus onset asynchrony in such settings (e.g., Pashler, 1989 Pashler, , 1994 . The present results (Experiment 1) are concordant with such a view; responding and early perceptual analysis may be carried out simultaneously without measurable impact on perception. However, our results do not support the argument that attentional limitations in perception and those in responding are hermetically separate. Pashler (1998) has gone as far as claiming that "perceptual analysis, whether overloaded or not, typically occurs without interference from ongoing central operations" (p. 404). The present studies are clearly at variance with this claim, showing repeatedly that early perceptual analysis can be disrupted by ongoing central operations. We suggest that the response bottleneck identified by Pashler (1998) is a distinct form of attentional limitation independent from the central-perceptual interference found in the present studies.
One reason for the discrepancy between previous investigations and the form of interference found in the present series of experiments is that perceptual interference has been confounded with the response bottleneck limitation (as in the case of Kahneman et al., 1967) . This is a problem manifest in any dual-task design in which the metric of performance in the primary task is one that involves responses made concurrently with the further processing of perceptual elements of the task (such as attempting to detect the next target). A clear indication of the locus of disruption is not possible in such cases; reduced levels of performance could arise from disruption to the perceptual, cognitive, or response generation elements of the primary task. Another reason may be that, while the degree of interference from central cognition on perception is never so great as to prevent the identification of a letter presented on-screen, changes in perceptual quality may have been evident in the motion aftereffect. Possibly, over the period of adaptation, small fluctuations in perceptual quality caused by engagement in the secondary task are summed together, resulting in a reduced motion aftereffect, but not necessarily any clearly discernable modification in perception evident to the individual.
Pre-and Postcategorical Distinction Reassessed
The present results seem to contradict both the specific theory of attention put forth by Lavie (2000) and also the general assumption in attention research it embodies: that pre-and postcategorical systems are functionally independent. Within both Lavie's theory and the general view (see Allport, 1993) , it is anticipated that attentional load should only exert influence on other activities that are on the same side of the pre-and postcategorical divide. Taken together, the three experiments presented here demonstrate that this rule does not always hold. One possible way of modifying Lavie's theory to make it compatible with the present data is to suppose that higher level cognitive activity may, under certain circumstances, be manifest as what presents itself as perceptual load. For example, it has been demonstrated that generating mental images (which may be an element of performing a high-level cognitive task if the participant uses it) can cause activation in sensory areas of the brain (e.g., Awh & Jonides, 2001; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000) . This possibility would seem a good candidate for further research. But it is to be noted that if both precategorical and postcategorical tasks require the use of the same underlying brain areas, we should have even less reason to think that a useful distinction can be drawn between the two classes of mental activity.
Although our claim that pre-and postcategorical processing are not independent seems to be at variance with the received view, there is some degree of convergence from other areas of cognitive psychology. Interference between the precategorical and postcategorical has been shown previously in studies of attentional selectivity in short-term memory. Here-unlike the present case, in which the relationship is reversed-postcategorical information has been interfered with by the obligatory processing at the perceptual level. Irrelevant sound has been shown repeatedly to be disruptive to information already in postcategorical form in shortterm memory (Jones, 1999) . The meaning of the irrelevant sound does not determine the degree of disruption caused; rather, it is the acoustic nature of the sound that is key (Macken, Tremblay, Alford, & Jones, 1999) . This is forcefully demonstrated by the fact that nonspeech sounds (such as tones) are a potent disrupter of short-term mnemonic processing (e.g., Jones & Macken, 1993) . The most disruptive irrelevant sound has the attribute of being segmentable into separate and different tokens; continuous sound or the repetition of the same token causes relatively little disruption to short-term memory (for a review, see Jones, 1999) .
Another line of evidence convergent with the present results emerges from an fMRI study undertaken by Just et al. (2001) . A mental imagery task and a verbal comprehension task were initially shown to activate nonoverlapping areas of the brain. Within the typical view of the functioning of both neural systems, and the pre-and postcategorical distinction, no interference between the two activities would be expected. However, it was found that when the two tasks were performed concurrently, the level of activation in both of the areas previous mapped was significantly reduced. Thus, there is evidence that a largely postcategorical sentence comprehension task can attenuate activity in sensory areas of the brain. Indeed, Just et al. (2001) speculated that the results of Rees et al. (1997) may not necessarily be to the intramodal allocation of visual spatial attention, but rather reflect some sort of overarching attentional limitation relating both perceptual and cognitive processing: "The constraint may arise not simply because one cannot look at two objects at the same time" (p. 425). The present study provides direct experimental evidence suggesting that this is a reasonable interpretation and that such limitations are readily demonstrable in relatively simple behavioral experiments. One limitation of the present series of experiments is that the metric of the motion aftereffect was the subjective report of duration. As discussed in the introduction, there is no reason to think that response bias played any systematic role in generating our results. Indeed, the fMRI data produced by Rees and colleagues (Rees et al., 1997 (Rees et al., , 2001 ) demonstrate that aftereffect duration reports remain closely related to brain activity thought to be indicative of the motion aftereffect even when attentional manipulations have taken place during motion adaptation. Although the present data are, in places, noisier than might be desirable, the effects reported are substantial in magnitude and thus unlikely to reflect aberrations in participants' response criteria. It would, however, be a worthwhile future project to extend the present results using different measures of the motion aftereffect and wider variations in the nature and extent of concurrent attentional loads.
The present studies converge on the conclusion that nonvisual and, indeed, nonsensory attentional tasks can significantly affect motion adaptation. Postcategorical cognitive activity can, at least in certain circumstances, impose restrictions on ongoing precategorical perceptual activity. The results militate against a simple account of the relationship between cognitive and perceptual processes.
